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The Potential of European Union Law to Further Advance LGBTQ+ Persons and 
Same-Sex Couples’ Rights 
Frances Hamilton, Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University 
This chapter considers in light of recent case law, the potential of European Union (‘EU’) law 
to further advance LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples’ rights. The EU system offers 
numerous opportunities in this respect due to the manifold influences of the EU concept of 
citizenship resulting in extensive free movement provisions and non-discrimination 
requirements as further enhanced by strengthening ties between the EU and the Council of 
Europe. The European Court of Human Rights stresses a lack of consensus on claims for 
same-sex marriage between its divergent 47 Member States leading to a wide margin of 
appreciation. In contrast, it is argued that the Court of Justice of the EU gives concerns about 
subsidiarity less prominence than over-riding EU law imperatives such as free movement of 
persons and non-discrimination provisions.  All of these points, together with more effective 
EU law enforcement provisions provide impetus and lead to opportunities for the EU further to 
develop rights for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. The possible impact of Brexit, 
where this would affect free movement of persons, means that UK LGBTQ+ persons and 
same-sex couples would not benefit from the possibilities of future development of EU law. 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally both the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) have been reluctant to recognise LGBTQ+ couples in their varying 
concepts of ‘family life.’ The situation is further complicated due to the diversity of responses 
across Europe to the recognition of same-sex relationships. Whilst 16 European countries (14 
within the European Union (‘EU’)) now recognise same-sex marriage, other European 
countries recognise civil partnership only, with varying degrees of rights given to each same-
sex couple. 1  In contrast seven states within the EU, all in Eastern Europe, continue to 
 
1 Sixteen European nations have recognised same-sex marriage. As of July 2019 this includes Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland although this 
will change on 21st October unless a devolved government is re-established) and many more recognise 
civil partnership (Andorra, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Slovenia and Switzerland). 
 
constitutionally define marriage as between partners of the opposite sex only.2 This difference 
in treatment of same-sex couples forms a complex web, made more difficult by the impact of  
globalisation.3  On a practical basis couples need to know whether their same-sex union will 
be legally recognised. 4  For proponents of same-sex marriage there is also the added 
motivation of considering which court and type of claim may offer the best prospect of 
succesful recognition of rights. 
This chapter argues that in recent years the CJEU has begun to take a leading approach in 
furthering rights for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples across Europe. The European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘European Convention) is not an EU instrument, but the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘EUCFR’) provides that ; ‘[i]n so far as this [EUCFR] contains 
rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the [European Convention], the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the … [European Convention.],5 
and expressly states that ‘[t]his provision shall not prevent [EU] law providing more extensive 
protection.’ 6  Two cases demonstrating a trend from the CJEU to offer more extensive 
protection for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples in the context of both free movement 
and non-discrimination provisions are discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
 
2  Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. For further discussion see Alina 
Tryfonidou, ‘The EU Top Court  Rules that Married Same-Sex Couples Can Move Freely Between EU 
Member States as “Spouses’: Case C-673/16, Relu Adrian Coman  Robert Clabourn Hamilton, 
Asociaţia Accept v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne’ (2019) Feminist 
Legal Studies 1; Case C-673/16 Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept v 
Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne ECLI:EU:C:2018:2. 
 
3 The Centre for Social Justice, “European Family Law: Faster Divorce and Foreign Law” (2009), at 5 
explains that there are 350,000 international marriages each year.   
<www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/core/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CSJEuropeanFamilyLaw.pdf> 
accessed 31 July 2019.   
 
4  See Robert Jackson J in Estin v Estin, 334 US 541, 553 (1948) and Barbara Stark, ‘When 
Globalization Hits Home: International Family Law Comes of Age’ (2006) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1551. 
 
5 EUCFR, art 52(3),  
 
6 Ibid.  
 
In Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and others: Case 
C-673/16 (Coman) the CJEU confirmed the prior opinion of Advocate General Melchior 
Wathelet that a same-sex marriage conducted in one EU Member State must be recognised 
in another for the purposes of free movement and residence rights of the non EU-citizen 
spouse.7  This is the case even where the receiving country, as is the case for Romania, does 
not recognise same-sex marriage. Coman represents a ‘welcome first step,’8 in moving away 
from years of EU stress on subsidiarity and demonstrates the expanding nature of EU 
citizenship and considerations of who are EU family members. In MB v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions (MB), the CJEU determined that provisions of the UK Gender Recognition 
Act 2004 (GRA) which required transpersons to annul existing marriages in order not only be 
recognised in their new sex but to access state pension benefits at the age ascribed to their 
acquired gender was discriminatory on the ground of sex.9 The requirement to annul a pre-
existing marriage is no longer necessary to obtain a full gender recognition certificate,10 but 
that requirement still applied at the time MB came to claim her pension in 2008. 11  This had a 
direct on MB, as the UK state still officially recognised her as male (as she did not wish to 
annul her pre-existing marriage), she could only claim her pension from the age of 65, as 
opposed to the age of 60 for women as then stipulated by legislation (prior to state pension 
reform).12 The CJEU’s judgment demonstrates a willingness to depart from more restictive 
 
7 See Coman (n 2) 
 
8 See Tryfonidou (n 2) 1. 
 
9 Case C-451/16 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ECLI:EU:C:2018:492, This was found 
to violate Article 4 of Directive 79/7 on the Progressive Implementation of the Principle of Equal 
Treatment for Men and Women in Matters of Social Security. 
 
10 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Sch 5, amended by the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013, 
providing the spouse consents. 
 
11 Pre-existing Schedule 5, paragraph 7 Gender Recognition Act 2004 (prior to reform by the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013). 
 
12 Section 44 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 read in conjunction with section 
122 of that Act and with Schedule 4 paragraph 1 of the Pensions Act 1995 stated that a woman born 
before 6 April 1950 becomes eligible for the state retirement pension from the age of 60. In contrast, 
men born before 6 December 1953 become eligible at the age of 65.  
 
case law on this particular point,13 but also to reach further expanding understandings of the 
widening concept of non-discrimination rights to be given to LGBTQ+ persons who are EU 
citizens.  
 
After a brief critique of the traditional position of the EU and the ECtHR regarding treatment of 
LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples, the next sections examine further influences 
widening CJEU opportunities to act in this respect.  Factors of EU citizenship resulting in 
extensive free movement provisions and non-discrimination requirements, coupled with the 
promince of these points in comparison to subsidiarty considerations before the CJEU, will be 
discussed. All demonstrating the possibilities of CJEU expansion of rights for LGBTQ+ 
persons and same-sex couples. If Brexit impacts on free movement of persons, as it is likely 
to, UK LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples will no longer be able to benefit from 
expanding EU free movement rights and interventions by the CJEU. 
 
2. Traditional position of the ECtHR and the EU regarding treatment of LGBTQ+ 
persons and same-sex couples. 
The ECtHR has played a major role in the advancement of LGBTQ+ persons rights. ECtHR 
cases have resulted in judgments requiring contracting states to decriminalise sodomy laws,14 
to require equality in employment as regards sexual orientation15 and in tenancy conditions 
for LGBTQ+ persons.16 Historically, however, the ECtHR did not consider that same-sex 
relationships could generate ‘family life.’17 Such unions were considered as being relevant in 
 
13 Case C-117/01 K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health 
[2004] ECR I-00542 and Case C-243/04, Sarah Margaret Richards v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2006] ECR I-03585 
14 Dudgeon v UK App No 7525/76 (ECtHR, 22 October 1981). 
15 Smith and Grady v UK App Nos 33985/96 and 33986/96 (ECtHR, 27 September 1999) and Lustig-
Prean and Beckett v UK App Nos 31417/96 and 32377/96 (ECtHR, 27 September 1999). 
 
16 Karner v Austria App No 40016/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2003); EB v France, App No. 43546/ 02 (ECtHR, 
22 January 2008). 
 
17  X and Y v UK App No 21830/93 (ECtHR, 22 April 1997); Simpson v UK App No 11716/85, 
(Commission Decision, 14 May 1986); Kerkhoven and Hinke v The Netherlands App No 15666/89 
(Commission Decision, 19 May 1992) and Mata Estevez v Spain, App No 56501/00 (ECtHR, 10 May 
2001).  
reference to a right to a private life only.18 This led to much criticism that the traditional position 
before the ECtHR overtly favoured heterosexual relationships19 and restricted the ‘evolution’ 
of LGBTQ+ persons’ rights in Europe.’20  The ECtHR has continued to incrementally advance 
the position of same-sex couples. Same-sex couples are now included within the definition of 
family life, 21  advances have been made to protect LGBTQ+ persons’ adoption rights, 22 
contracting states are required to recognise some form of legal protection for same-sex 
couples 23  and to recognise same-sex marriages conducted abroad. 24  Ultimately, due to 
concerns about the ‘deep rooted social and cultural connotations’ of marriage,25  leading case 
law from the ECtHR confirms that a consensus must develop between contracting states, 
before it is prepared to move forwards on this issue.26  Whilst on other areas of family law the 
ECtHR also prefers to be deferential towards contracting states and allow them a large margin 
 
 
18 Susana Cabellero, ‘Unmarried Cohabiting Couples Before the European Court of Human Rights: 
Parity with Marriage?’ (2004-2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 151, 152.  
 
19 Helen Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family under EU Law – Lessons from the ECHR’ (2002) 16 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 410, 411.  
 
20  Paul Johnson, ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of 
Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 67, 76.  
 
21 See Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application No 30141/04, (ECtHR, 24 June 2010), para 94. Described 
by Connor O’Mahoney, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Article 8 ECHR and Irish Law on Non-Traditional 
Families’ (2012) 26 International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 31 at 38 as a ‘landmark judgment’ 
and Elaine Sutherland, ‘A Step Closer to Same-Sex Marriage Throughout Europe’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh 
Law Review 97.  
 
22 See for example EB v France (n 16) which concerned single parent adoption in France. 
 
23 Oliari v Italy App Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015). 
 
24 Orlandi v Italy App no. 26431/12 (ECtHR, 14 December 2017) 
 
25 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n 21) para 62. 
 
26 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n 21). 
 
of appreciation (‘MoA’) to determine matters for themselves as informed the national context,27 
when considering the quickly advancing case law for LGBTQ+ persons just set out, in contrast 
same-sex marriage can be regarded as being a ‘lex specialis’ which requires special 
consideration.28  
Traditionally the CJEU was even stricter than the ECtHR with regards to its treatment of 
LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. Former case law, rejected inclusion of sexual 
orientation within the ground of sexual orientation discrimination. 29 Only traditional family 
formats were included within the scope of family life.30  Although free movement provisions 
referred to spouses and registered partners within the definition of family member, prior to the 
recent Coman case31 EU law stressed subsidiarity.  Member states were free to determine 
their own policy with regards to recognition of same-sex unions.32  This ignored not only the 
 
27 For example in relation to abortion see the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments in Paton v 
UK App no 8416/78 (ECtHR, 13 May 1980) Vo v France App no 53924/00 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004) and 
A,B and C v Ireland App no. 25579/05, (ECtHR, 16 Dec 2010). 
 
28 See US Legal Dictionary, ‘Lex Specialis Law and Legal Definition’ (USLegal.com, n.d.) 
<http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-specialis/> accessed 31 July 2019. Loveday Hodson, ‘A Marriage 
by any other name? Shalk and Kopf v Austria.’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 170 at 177 
argues that marriage is being set apart from the other family rights and being treated as an 
‘untouchable, almost sacred, category.’ 
 
29 See, for example, Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains [1998] ECR I-621, [1998] 1 CMLR 993.. 
See for discussion Dimitri Kochenov, “On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and 
European Federalism” (2009) 33 Fordham International Law Review 156, 175. 
 
30  For example, Case C-59/85 Netherlands v Reed [1987] 2 CMLR 448: the CJEU determined that 
‘‘spouse’ only included an individual in a marital relationship’. 
 
31 Coman (n 2).  
 
32  Citizenship Directive 2004/ 38 art 2(2) provides that  ‘(f)amily member’ means... (b) the partner with 
whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership on the basis of the legislation of a 
Member State if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent 
to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host 
Member State...’ Commentary on Article 9 of the EUCFR provided that ‘There is, however, no explicit 
requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages. International courts and committees 
have so far hesitated to extend the application of the right to marry to same-sex couples. (...). The 
position is now transformed following the high profile case of Coman  (n2).  
 
apparent gender neutrality of the word spouse33 but the imperative of free movement.’34 In 
one commentator’s view this privileged the heterosexual norm.35 Cohabitants, have never 
been explicitly included within the EU ‘family member’ definition having to prove their 
relationship ‘duly attested.’36 This latter definition is vague, and does not automatically allow 
partners to move with their EU citizen partner. Instead, all it requires is for the host Member 
State to be able to demonstrate thoroughly that they have investigated the personal 
circumstances concerned.37  
The restrictive interpretation of family member had real consequences. Prior to the Coman 
case, non-EU national same-sex spouses, could not relocate with their EU citizen spouse to 
an EU country which did not recognise their union.  Being denied the status of ‘family member’ 
also led to being denied the ‘plethora of benefits’38 which would otherwise have been accorded 
to EU citizens and their family members. These included rights to residence,39 recourse to a 
member state’s social assistance scheme, 40  ensuring equal treatment with host-country 
 
33 See Kochenov (n 29) at 190. Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s recent Advocate General’s 
Opinion in Coman (n 2) endorsed the approach that spouse should be interpreted in a gender-neutral 
manner.  
34 See Stalford (n 19) 419 and also Barbara Cox, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry 
in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?” (1994) Wisconsin Law Review 1033, 1040 
which states that Non-recognition of a foreign marriage means that the right to same-sex marriage is a 
“meagre right indeed.’ 
 
35 See Kochenov (n 29) 201. 
 
36 Citizenship Directive 2004/38, Article 3(2). 
 
37 Case C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman and 
Others ECLI:EU:C:2012:519 and Case C-89/17 Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Rozanne Banger  ECLI:EU:C:2018:570. 
 
38 See Stalford (n 19) 427. 
 
39 Citizenship Directive 2004/38, art 14(1). 
 
40 Ibid, Art 14(3). 
 
nationals,41 allowing family members to take up employment or self-employment42  right of 
continuous legal residence after 5 years,43 schooling provisions44 and protections from non-
discrimination.45 It is argued that the cases of Coman and MB demonstrate the willingness to 
expand free movement and non-discrimination rights for LGBTQ+ persons. There remains a 
debate as to whether such examples are limited to their particular facts, or whether they can 
truly be considered as part of trend. The next section looks at the normative understanding of 
the EU concept of citizenship.  Further sections then consider how the relationship of this 
concept to extensive free movement provisions and non-discrimination requirements as 
further enhanced by strengthening ties between the EU and the Council of Europe, provides 
an opportunity to develop rights for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. Consequently, 
following Brexit, UK LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples where this effects free 
movement of persons and the remit of the CJEU, would no longer be able to benefit from these 
expanding EU protections.  
 
3. How should the Concept of EU Citizenship be Understood? 
 
Citizenship is one of the key concepts utilised by the CJEU to justify expansion of rights for 
EU citizens. The emergence of new populations such as LGBTQ+ persons poses a challenge 
to existing concepts of citizenship. It is therefore interesting to consider different theoretical 
considerations of the meaning of citizenship and reflect on this in the EU context. Historically, 
 
41 Ibid, Art 24. 
 
42 Ibid, Art 23. 
 
43 Ibid, Art 16. 
 
44 For discussion see John Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (9th edn, Pearson Publishing 2012) at 
405 who refers to Case C-9/74 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München [1974] ECR 00773 
and Case C-412/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
07091 
 
45 Citizens are protected from discrimination on grounds of nationality under Article 18 TFEU. See also 
Article 19 TFEU allows European Council together with the European Parliament to adopt measures 
preventing discrimination non the ground of ‘sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation.’ The EU has also adopted the provision of the EUCFR which at art 21(1) which 
includes ‘same-sex orientation’ as ground for discrimination. 
 
theorists concentrated on the deep connection between citizenship and equality rights. 46 
Classical theorist T H Marshall considered that citizenship required that ‘all who possess the 
status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.’47 This 
consideration of citizenship as inherently including equality can also be seen in classic 
constitutional text associated with the French Revolution 48  and the Irish constitution. 49  
Equality arguments have also been prominent in same-sex marriage cases which have been 
successful worldwide.50 I have argued elsewhere that the connections between citizenship, 
equality and marriage all led to strong practical and symbolic arguments for proponents of 
same-sex marriage.51  
 
The connection between citizenship and equality has been heavily critiqued. Queer and 
feminist authors have questioned the reality of equality for feminist and LGBTQ+ groups. 
Following Coman, the position of the CJEU determining that free movement and residence 
 
46  See for example Nicholas Bamforth, ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional 
Argument’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 477; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Introduction: 
Gender, Sexual Orientation and Equal Citizenship’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
340 and Connor O’Mahoney, ‘There is No Such thing as a Right to Dignity’ (2012) 10 International  
Journal of  Constitutional Law 551. 
 
47 Bamforth (n 46) 478 referring to Thomas H Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in Thomas H 
Marshall and Tom Bottomore (eds) Citizenship and Social Class (Pluto Press 1992) 18. 
 
48 Rosenfeld (n 46) 340. Who explains that citizenship acquired its “its distinct modern meaning as equal 
citizenship at the time of the French Revolution” 
 
49 Constitution of Ireland, art.40(1). O’Mahoney, ‘There Is No Such thing as a Right to Dignity’ (n 46), 
554-555 who refers to the Irish constitution which states that “[a]ll citizens shall, as human persons be 
held equal before the law.” He also refers to Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza 
[2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557 where Baroness Hale states that “[d]emocracy is founded on the 
principle that each individual has equal value”. 
 
50 See for example Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass 2003); Loving v 
Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) and Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015). 
 
51 Frances Hamilton, ‘The Differing Treatment of Same Sex Couples by European Union Law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights: The European Union Concept of Citizenship’ (2015) 2 Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 87. 
 
rights (essential elements of EU citizenship) should also include non-EU citizen same-sex 
spouses,52 could lead to criticism by those who dispute the appropriateness of same-sex 
marriage as a goal.53 Many feminists would question the need for marriage for LGBTQ+ 
persons on the basis that over the course of history it has been an institution which has raised 
concerns as being ‘deeply oppressive to, women as a class’.54  On this view if one of the 
driving forces for change behind LGBTQ+ movements is egalitarianism, same-sex marriage 
is seen as deeply ‘inappropriate.’55 Some queer theorists would also reject same-sex marriage 
as a goal due to concerns about ‘dominative heteronormative assumptions’ not being 
questioned.56 This includes concerns that same-sex marriage is trying to incorporate LGBTQ+ 
persons into the mainstream,57 and that the advent of same-sex marriage is interrupting 
LGBTQ+ persons unique interpretation of family life.58  Queer theorists consider that same-
sex marriage could result in LGBTQ+ persons being de-sexualised59 and losing their unique 
LGBTQ+ identity.60 Ultimately, on this view the EU requirement in Coman of member state 
 
52 Coman (n 2).  
 
53 For example, see, Lisa Duggan., ‘Beyond Same-Sex Marriage’ (2008) 9 Studies in Gender and 
Sexuality 155. 
 
54 Rosemary Auchmuty, ‘Same Sex Marriage Revived: Feminist Critique and Legal Strategy’ (2004) 14 
Feminist and Psychology 101, 104. See also, Yvonne Zylan, States of Passion, Identity and Social 
Construction of Desire (OUP 2011) 204. 
 
55 Auchmuty (n 54) 104. 
 
56 Lisa Duggan, ‘The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism’ in Dana Nelson and 
Russ Castronovo (Eds) ‘Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics’ (Duke 
University Press 2002) 175.  
 
57 Diane Richardson, ‘Desisting Sameness? The Rise of Neoliberal Politics of Normalisation’ (2005) 
37 Antipodes 519. 
 
58  Jyl Josephson, ‘Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage and Feminist Criitques of Marriage’ (2005) 3 
Perspectives on Politics 269 at 273 referring to Mark Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, 
and the Ethics of Queer Life (Free Press 1999). 
59 Richardson (n 57).  
 
60 Duggan (n 53). 
recognition of same-sex marriage for free movement and residency purposes, contributes to 
the creation of ‘sexual hierarchies’61 and actually prevents the citizenship of LGBTQ+ persons 
being fully realised.62 Instead queer theorists prefer a more ‘thoroughgoing resistance to 
regimes of the normal.’63 They reject labels and statuses such as same-sex marriage and civil 
partnership and argue that the multifarious ways in which LGBTQ+ persons have built their 
own relationships should be celebrated.64 The attractiveness of ever advancing models of 
family life cannot be denied. Such theoretical perspectives continue to be of immense value 
in questioning what the role of law should be in this area. Beresford also acknowledges the 
role which queer theory has played in destabilizing hetereosexual nroms.65 Yet queer and 
feminist theorists are often divided amongst themselves, with Beresford arguing that queer 
theory has become synonymous with white gay men, thus denying its origins and becoming 
distinctly anti-feminist, failing to fully acknowledge patriarchy and rendering lesbian women 
invisible, consequently failing to acknowledge and accommodate the lived experience of 
women.66 Therefore any recommendation of a wholesale change in society by queer theorists 
may be disputed, is academic in nature and does not fit with the EU’s inherently practical and 
rights based approach.  
 
Other authors would look to different interpretations of citizenship. Moving away from 
contested understandings of equality, this would instead consider wider conceptions of 
citizenship to include considerations of responsibilities towards the wider community and 
social processes through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding 
 
 
61 Brian Heaphy, Carol Smart and Anna Einarsdottir, Same Sex Marriages: New Generations, New 
Relationships (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 132. 
 
62 Josephson (n 58). 
 
63   Mark Warner (Ed), Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory, (University of 
Minnesota Press 1993) 7.  
 
64 Duggan (n 53).  
 
65 Sarah Beresford, ‘The Age of Consent and the Ending of Queer Theory’ (2014) 3 Laws 759 
 
66  Beresford (n 65).  
 
or losing rights.67 This view of citizenship includes the drive to question what it means to be 
included and to belong.68  On this view citizenship would be understood as granting legal, 
political and social rights, and conferring membership, identity, values and rights of 
participation and assuming a body of common political knowledge. 69  This has led to a 
sociologically informed definition of citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules 
and more on normal practices, meanings and identities.70 In turn citizens in a democracy 
should have membership status and ascribe to an identity and set of values usually involved 
as practising a degree of participation in political life and understanding relevant laws, 
documents, structures and process of governance in the political unit.71 Werbner and Yuval-
Davis argue that citizenship is no longer understood simply in terms of ‘the formal relationship 
between the individual and the state’ but as ‘a more total relationship inflected by identity, 
social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging’.72 
This accords with the EU’s aspiration to engage with citizens in a ‘more meaningful and direct 
way’73  and for EU citizens to feel a sense of belonging to the EU.74 This is arguably of 
essential importance in a Brexit era.  
 
 
67 Ruth Lister, ‘Why Citizenship: Where, How and Why Children’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
693 and Engin F. Isin and Bryan S Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: An Introduction’ in Engin F. Isin, and 
Bryan Turner (eds) Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Sage, 2002). 
 
 
68  Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging 
(Stanford University Press 2007). 
 
69 See Kathleen Knight Abowitz and Jason Harnish, ‘Contemporary Discourses of Citizenship’ (2006) 
76 Review of Educational Research 653 and Kate Nash, ‘Between Citizenship and Human Rights’ 
(2004) 43 Sociology 1067 at 1067 referring to Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez, ‘Born in the Americas: 
Birthright Citizenship and Human Rights (2012) 25 Harvard Human Rights Journal 127. 
 
70 Ruth Lister (n 67) 699. 
 
71 Penelope Enslin, ‘Education and Democratic Citizenship: In Defence of Cosmopoli-tanism’ in Mal 
Leicester, Celia Modgil and Sohan Modgil (eds), Politics, education and citizenship (Falmer Press 2000)  
 
72 Pnina Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Introduction: Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship in 
Pnina Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis (Eds) Women, Citizenship and Difference (Zed, 1999).  
 
73 Stalford (n 19) 413. See, Hamilton (n 51). 
 
74 See Nash (n 69) at 1068 referring to Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History and the 
Cosmopolitan Dream (Routledge 2007).    
If citizenship is seen as having a ‘long history of evolution,’75  always being an aspirational 
ideal which is ‘…less than complete,’76 one of the driving forces of change is the need to 
accommodate new populations.77 This article grapples with the question as to how the EU 
concept of citizenship is gradually being extended to include otherwise ‘disenfranchised’ 
LGBTQ+ groups.78 The Coman case would therefore support movement towards those who 
view marriage as having a constitutional nature and involving ‘participation in the public 
order.’79 For proponents of same-sex marriage, a right to marriage would on this view be 
considered as a ‘right central to citizenship.’80 Recognition of same-sex marriage allows a 
choice for those who view this as a ‘gold-standard.’81 This accords with research from Pew 
which demonstrates growing public opinion in favour of same-sex marriage across liberal 
 
75 Gershon Shafir and Alison Brysk, ‘The Globalization of Rights: From Citizenship to Human Rights’ 
(2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 275, 279.   
 
76 Lydia Morris, ‘Citizenship and Human Rights: Ideals and Actualities (2012) 63 British Journal of 
Sociology 39 referring to David Lockwood, ‘Civil Integration and Class Formation’ (1996) 47 British 
Journal of Sociology 531, 536.  
77 Shafir and Byrsk (n 75) 279 referring to Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of 
Minority Rights (OUP 1995).  
 
78 Shafir and Byrsk (n 75) 279. 
 
79 Bamforth (n 46) 481 referring to Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 
(Harvard University Press 2002) 1.  
 
80 See Bamforth (n 46),Jeffrey Weeks, ‘The Sexual Citizen’ (1998) 15 Theory, Culture and Society 38, 
David Bradley, ‘Comparative Law, Family Law and Common Law’ (2003) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 127; Kochenov (n 29).  
 
81 See Sue Wilkinson in her Witness Statement contained in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 
(Fam), para 6. 
 
democracies worldwide,82 the result of the Republic of Ireland referendum,83 leading cases84  
and the changing position of gay rights movements to adopt a more positive view towards 
same-sex marriage.85 In contrast authors have commented that denying access to marriage 
provides LGBTQ+ persons ‘partial citizenship’ status only.86  Equally the MB case, extending 
non-discrimination rights to LGBTQ+ persons claiming state pension benefits, would support 
views of inclusive citizenship, on both a ‘social and legal’ level.87   Following Brexit, UK same-
sex couples would not be able to benefit from advances in rights connected to EU citizenship. 
The next section considers the impact of further expansion of non-discrimination rights before 
the EU.  
 
4 . Expanding Non-Discrimination Rights for LGBTQ+ Persons 
 
Although the EU and the Council of Europe were set up for very different purposes, with the 
ECtHR being a recognised world leading human rights court and the EU primarily 
concentrating on economic rights, recent years have seen the EU working closely with the 
 
82  See Pew Research Centre, ‘Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage’ (14 May 2019) 
<www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/> accessed 31 July 2019. Pew 
Research Centre has surveyed public opinion on same-sex marriage since 2001 and documents 
increasing support for this.  
 
83 In a referendum held on 22nd May 2015, with a 60% turnout, 62% voted in favour of same-sex 
marriage and 38% voted against.  
 
84 See, eg, Goodridge v Department of Public Health (n 50) Loving v Virginia (n 50) and Obergefell v 
Hodges (n 50).  
 
85 See Zylan (n 54) 205 referring to Evan Wolfson, ‘Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for 
Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique’ (1994) 21 New York University Review of 
Law and Social Change 567, 611. 
 
86 Bamforth (n 46) 483 referring to Richardson (n) at 88. See also Angela Harris, ‘Loving before and 
after the Law’ (2008) 76 Fordham Law Review 2821, 2822 and Kochenov (n 28) 163. 
 
87 Cossman (n 68) 27. 
Council of Europe.88 The European Covnention does have a ‘significant impact’ on the EU.89 
It is part of the agreement under the Lisbon Treaty, for the EU to accede to the ECHR90  and 
it is part of the accession criteria for applicant EU member states to comply with human 
rights.91 The Coman and MB cases92 are just some of many recent instances of ‘judicial 
borrowing’ between the institutions.93 The joint focus of both the EU and the ECHR on non-
discrimination provisions,94 has given both organisations a common goal.95 Previously the 
 
88 See the ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union’ 
(CM(2007)74, 10 May 2007) prepared at the 117th Session of the Committee of Ministers (Strasbourg), 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2007)74&Language=lanEnglish> accessed 31 July 2019. 
See also, for comment, Tony Joris and Jan Vandenberghe, ‘The Council of Europe and the European 
Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ (2008-2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 1, 
3.  
 
89 See Chapter by Tryfonidou in this edited collection. 
90 TEU art.6(2) provides that “[t]he Union shall access to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. In addition, the fundamental rights of the ECHR are 
incorporated into the EUCFR, which from 1 December 2009 has the same legal status as the treaties. 
 
91  See, European Commission, ‘Conditions for membership’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm> accessed 31 July 
2019.  
 
92 Coman (n 2) and MB (n 9).  
 
93  See for discussion Janneke Gerards, “The Prism of Fundamental Rights” (2012) 8 European 
Constitutional Law Review 173, 192. 
 
94 Andrea Eriksson, “European Justice: Broadening the Scope of European Non-Discrimination Law” 
(2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 731 at 733 argues that other recent cases show the 
CJEU is inclined to extend non-discrimination provisions referring to Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] 2 CMLR 32 [63]; Case C-147/08  Jurgen Romer v 
Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I-03592 and Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law and 
Steve Law [2008] ECR I-05603 
 
95 Carmelo Danisis, ‘How Far Can the European Court of Human Rights Go in the Fight against 
Discrimination? Defining New Standards in Its Non-Discrimination Jurisprudence’ (2011) 9 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 793 and Marta Cartabia, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: Judging 
Non-Discrimination’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 808. 
CJEU’s approach to LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples was undermined by the 
continued emphasis on subsidiarity.96 Recent case law as exemplified by MB and Coman97 
together with recent legislation from the EU,98 demonstrates that the CJEU is expanding its 
non-discrimination principles where LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples are concerned.  
Perhaps previous predictions that the CJEU is engaging in a ‘rights revolution’99 are coming 
to fruition. 
 
The EUCFR has given additional prominence to human rights considerations in an EU context. 
Sexual orientation is set out as a protected discrimination characteristic,100 thereby arguably 
‘creat[ing] a completely new crosscutting fundamental right.’101  This allows the CJEU an 
opportunity to provide more ‘exensive protection’ to human rights than the ECtHR.102 The 
European Convention drafted in the 1950s does not specifically refer to sexual orientation as 
a protected ground of discrimination. Under Article 14 European Convention non-
discrimination is a conditional right only.103 Litigants have to bring their case under the ambit 
 
 
96  Jakob Cornides, ‘Three case studies on ‘Anti-Discrimination’’ (2012) 23 European Journal of 
International Law 517, 522. See also Kochenov (n 28).   
 
97 MB (n 9) and Coman. (n 2).  
 
98 This includes for example Citizenship Directive 2004/38, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 2000/C 364/01 and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing 
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation OJ L 303. 
 
99 Mark Dawson, Elise Muir and Monica Claes, ‘Enforcing the EU’s Rights Revolution; the Case of 
Equality’ (2012) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 276.  
 
100 The EUCFR art.21(1) provides that “[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, ethic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited”. 
 
101 Cornides (n 96) 531. 
 
102 EUCFR, Art 52(3).. 
 
103 Article 14 European Convention provides that ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
of another human rights article together with an alleged breach of Article 14. Cases concerning 
LGBTQ+ rights before the ECtHR have therefore been commonly framed under Article 8 right 
to a private life,104 in combination with Article 14.  Whilst the ECtHR now recognises LGBTQ+ 
persons as falling within the family life definition before the ECtHR105 and more prominence 
has been placed on equality arguments,106 the continued status of article 14 as a conditional 
right, makes claims to the ECtHR more complex. If free standing non-discrimination Protocol 
12 of the European Convention were to be ratified, this would greatly improve the position of 
litigants before the ECtHR. Currently, this is only ratified by 20 out of 47 ECHR contracting 
states and the UK is not a signatory.107  
 
Both Coman and MB are examples of cases where the CJEU has been prepared to take a 
leading role, as compared to the equivalent stance of the ECtHR.108 In the Coman judgment, 
limited reference to human rights arguments was made by the CJEU. 109  The influential 
Advocate General Opinion of Melchior Wathelet, prior to the CJEU judgment in Coman saw 
more reference to human rights arguments. His conclusion that spouse should be interpreted 
in a ‘gender neutral’ manner110 was made by reference to ECtHR case law.111 ECtHR case 
 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status…’ 
 
104 See for example Dudgeon v UK (n 14) and ADT v UK App No 35765/97 (ECtHR 31 July 2000) at 
para 37, where the court emphasised the fact that the ‘activities… were genuinely private.’ 
 
105 Schalk v Kopf (n 21), para 94. 
 





108 Coman (n 2) and MB (n 9).  
 
109 Coman (n 2) para 49 and 50. 
 
110 Coman (n 2) Opinion of AG Melchior Wathelet, para 49.  
 
111 Ibid at paragraph 59 – 67.  
 
law was used as authority for LGBTQ+ persons’ right to family life, 112  prohibition of 
discrimination against LGBTQ+ persons113 and a requirement that contracting states should 
provide ‘couples [with] legal recognition and the legal protection of their relationships.’114  In 
reality, Melchior Wathelet’s interpretation goes further than that actually provided by the 
ECtHR. Firstly, as stated above, Article 14 is a conditional right, reliance on which depends 
upon falling within the ambit of another alleged breach of human rights. It  is also debatable 
as to what concrete result Oliari v Italy115  provide to same-sex couples. Fenwick and Hayward 
argue, that Oliari v Italy should be confined to the facts where same-sex couples were socially 
accepted on the ground.116 This claim is now being tested by a Russian same-sex couple.117 
Finally, Oliari v Italy118 did not require any conditions to be attached to the legal framework to 
be provided to same-sex couples. This may result in minimal legal protection. Schalk and Kopf 
v Austria is still authority for the ECtHR not requiring Council of Europe contracting states to 
recognise same-sex marriage.119 
 
 
112 Ibid at paragraphs 62 – 63 referring to among other cases Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n 21) at para 
94.  
 
113 Ibid at paragraphs 64 -65 referring to, among other cases, Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy App No 
51362/09 (ECtHR, 30 June 2016) para 93.  
 
114 Ibid at paragraph 62 referring to Oliari v Italy (n 23).  
 
115 Oliari v Italy (n 23).  
 
116  For comment see Helen Fenwick and Andy Hayward, ‘Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal 
Relationship Statuses for Same and Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically’ (2017) 6 
European Human Rights Law Review 545. 
 
117 See Irina Borisovna Fedotova and Irina Vladimironova Shipitko v Russia App No 40792/10 (ECtHR, 
Communicated on 2 May 2016)  
 
118 Oliari v Italy (n 23).  
 
119 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n 21).  
 
The CJEU ruling in MB,120 is also progressive as compared to the comparative position of the 
ECtHR. The ECtHR has continued to allow contracting states an MoA in relation to the specific 
challenge around the legal recognition of acquired gender being condition upon annulment of 
that person’s marriage. 121 Whilst more recent case law has seen the ECtHR finding violations 
of Article 8 in relation to state requirements concerning gender assignment regarding where 
the applicant is required to be compulsorily sterilised122 or required to wait lengthy periods,123 
there remains nothing to prevent ECtHR contracting states putting in place other onerous pre-
conditions prior to recognizing the gender sex reassignment. If and where Brexit were to affect 
the remit of the CJEU this would mean that UK based LGBTQ+ persons would no longer be 
able to benefit from such far reaching judgments of the CJEU.  
 
5. Subsidiarity Concerns at the European Union Level 
Due to concerns about a lack of consensus the ECtHR does not require contracting states to 
legalise same-sex marriage.124  This leads the ECtHR to provide a wide MoA, otherwise 
known as a ‘latitude of deference or error…’125 to contracting states on this issue. The main 
purpose of the MoA doctrine is to respect the ‘social identity’126 or moral values127  of individual 
 
120 See MB (n 9) which found a violation of Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which prohibits all forms of 
discrimination on the ground of sex in relation to accessing state pension benefits. 
 
121 See Hamalainen v Finland, App No. 37359/09 (ECtHR, 16 July 2014).  
 
122 A. P. Garcon and Nicot v France App Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13 (ECtHR, 6 April 2017).  
 
123 S.V. v Italy App no. 55216/08 (ECtHR, 11 October 2018) (only available in French). 
 
124 See Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n 21) para 57, Hamalaninen v Finland (n 121) para 39 and Chapin 
and Charpentier v France App No 40183/07 (ECtHR, 9 June 2016). 
 
125 Petra Butler, “Margin of Appreciation – a Note towards a Solution for the Pacific” (2008–2009) 39 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 687 referring to Howard C Yourow, Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Brill 1996) at 13. 
 
126Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Margins of Appreciation; National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free 
Movement Law (2009) 34 European Law Review 230, 230. 
127 For discussion, see, Jeffrey Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law (2004-2005) 113 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 119.  
 
countries. Whilst universalists would always consider that human rights should have 
prominence,128 regionalists consider that on issues concerning moral and cultural values, 
contracting states should be free to determine their own policies.129 The European Convention 
itself enshrines subsidiarity under Art 1 which places the prime duty to protect human rights 
on individual contracting states.130 These concerns are exacerbated at present as the ECtHR 
is adjudicating in a very nationalistic context. There are many criticisms about relying on 
consensus as a deciding factor. It is argued that the consensus doctrine ignores the interests 
of minority groups,131 and allows contracting states to determine matters without thorough 
going legal analysis and scrutiny. 132  Despite ECtHR statements observing a movement 
towards consensus, it remains unclear when this will be reached. 133 
 
Subsidiarity is of course a pressing concern for the EU as well. Political pressures have 
increased following Brexit, However, arguably the EU has greater opportunity to act in this 




128 See Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1998-1999) 31 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843 who argues at 843 that human rights 
bodies have a ‘duty to set universal standards.’ 
 
129 This was recently re-emphasised in the Council of Europe, ‘High Level Conference on the Future of 
the European Court of Human Rights (Brighton Declaration)’ (19-20 April 2012) B12 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> accessed 31 July 
2019.  
 
130 See European Convention, Art 1. 
 
131 See Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving 
Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis’ (2016) 3 EHRLR 248, 270. 
 
132 See for discussion Brauch (n 127) 137 
 
133 Oliari v Italy (n 23) para 163. 
 
134  See the Council of Europe, ’47 Member States’ <www.coe.int/en/web/portal/country-
profiles>.accessed 31 July 2019. 
 
countries such as Russia where gay propaganda laws are still in force.135 In comparison the 
EU member states are more homogeneous, (although divides should not be ignored).136 The 
CJEU gives concerns about subsidiarity less prominence than over –riding EU law imperatives 
such as free movement of persons and non-discrimination provisions. The EU states are 
increasingly bound together through the EU concept of an ‘ever closer’ union.137 One of the 
‘core objectives’ of the EU is free movement of persons,138 enabling all member state nationals 
the power to move freely between Member States.139 Coman saw the CJEU stressing the 
importance of free movement provisions, as opposed to subsidiarity concerns. The Latvian 
government had submitted a public-interest consideration on the basis of the ‘fundamental 
nature of the institution of marriage’140 arguing that a restriction of the free movement of EU 
citizens141 was justified ‘on ground of public policy and national identity,142 Although this public 
concern was treated with respect’143 ultimately the CJEU determined that it had to give way to 
the free movement imperative.144 In MB the UK government referred to ECtHR case law to 
 
135 See Fenwick (n131) 270 and Paul Johnson, ‘Homosexual Propaganda’ in the Russian Federation: 
Are They in Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2015) 3 Russian Law Journal 
37 
136 For instance, with Eastern European countries. See (n 2).   
137 The Preamble to the TEU which states that the signatories are ‘Resolved to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.’ 
138 See Tryfonidou (n 2) 2. 
 
139 TFEU, Art 20.. 
 
140 Coman (n 2) para 42.  
141 TFEU, Art 20 and 21. 
142 Article 4(2) TEU states that: "[t]he Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government as discussed in Coman (n 2) at para 42. 
 
143 Coman (n 2) para 43. 
 
144 Coman (n 2) para 44 referring to Case C-438/14 Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff ECLI:EU:C:2016:401, 
paragraph 67. 
 
emphasise the MoA given Member States to ‘make recognition of a change of gender 
conditional on the annulment of the person’s marriage.’145 The CJEU conceded this discretion 
to Member States but stated that in so doing they had to continue to comply with EU principles 
of non-discrimination.’146  Once again, the CJEU (in contrast to the position of the ECtHR) 
were prepared to over-rule subsidiarity concerns in favour of other pressing issues, here non-
discrimination.  
 
The EU also has far more effective enforcement mechanisms than the European Convention 
system. Whilst Article 46 European Convention gives ECtHR judgments binding force,147 this 
primarily depends upon contracting states complying with ECtHR judgments under 
supervision from the Committee of Ministers. In practice this means that many ECtHR 
judgments from the ECtHR remain unenforced.148 Arguably, this could deter the ECtHR from 
making far reaching judgments, due to concerns that judgments may not be observed. In 
contrast the CJEU has stronger enforcement methods.  Not least the principles of EU 





Traditionally the CJEU was even stricter than the ECtHR system in refusing to recognise non-
conventional family types. This chapter has demonstrated that EU law has much potential to 
further advance LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples’ rights. Whilst the normative 
meaning of citizenship remains contested, with some feminist and queer theorists questioning 
the reality of equality for their component citizens and disaffection with the recognition of 
 
145 See UK government’s argument at MB (n 9) para 24 referring to Hämäläinen v. Finland (n 121). 
 
147 European Convention, Art 46. 
 
148 See, for discussion, Ginger Hervey, ‘Europe’s human rights court struggles to lay down the law’ 
(Politico, 20 September 2017) <www.politico.eu/article/human-rights-court-ilgar-mammadov-
azerbaijan-struggles-to-lay-down-the-law/> accessed 31 July 2019. 
149 See Tryfonidou (n 2) for discussion. 
 
150 The state liability principle was established in Case C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich v. Italy [1991] 
ECR I-5357. 
.  
same-sex marriage,151 the EU concept of citizenship is to offer an ever expanding array of 
practical rights, to include emerging groups such as LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. 
EU citizenship has commonly been utilised by the EU to justify expansion of rights to EU 
citizens, and provide a plethora of benefits. 152   Of prominence here are expanding free 
movement and non-discrimination rights. The Coman and MB case studies demonstrate the 
potentiality of these concepts to further rights for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples.153 
In Coman, subsidiarity concerns were over-ridden in preference for the principle of free 
movement.154 Similarly in MB, non-discrimination rights were given prominence as opposed 
to Member States public policy concerns.155  
 
All of these factors point towards the CJEU being well placed to bring forwards development 
of rights for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. However, both the Coman case and the 
MB case were strictly confined to their facts.156 The CJEU observed clearly in Coman, that the 
case did not result in a requirement of member States to legalise same-sex marriage, but 
rather for Member States to allow free movement and residence rights for non-EU citizen 
spouses of same-sex marriages conducted in other Member States.157 The MB case was 
strictly confined to the facts of non-discrimination in relation to state retirement pension 
provisions.158 In addition, as Noto La Diega’s chapter demonstrates that there is a different 
and varied experience across the EU following Coman, with some Eastern European states 
currently reacting against this judgment.159 Still it seems that the CJEU has many opportunities 
to act to further LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couple’s rights. The inherent symbolic value 
 
151 Duggan (n 53).  
152 Stalford (n 19). 
 
153 Coman (n 2) and MB (n 9).  
 
154 Coman (n 2).  
 
155 MB (n 9).  
 
156 Coman (n 2) and MB (n 9).  
 
157 Coman (n 2). 
 
158 MB (n 9).  
 
159 Noto La Diega 
 
of the Coman judgment,160 which is also present in MB cannot be ignored.161 This contrasts 
with the position before the ECtHR where concerns about a lack of consensus, among a more 
divergent group of 47 Council of Europe states, still retains dominance. Ties between the EU 
and the Council of Europe are increasing in strength and following the EUCFR have become 
increasingly prominent. The free standing non-discrimination ground in the EUCFR162 together 
with the possibility that the EU can give human rights more ‘exensive protection’163 than the 
equivalent position before the ECtHR, are slowly coming to fruition.   If as anticipated, one of 
the consequences of Brexit is to affect free movement of persons, this means that UK same-
sex couples will have to continue to rely on whatever rights their country of destination sees 
fit to grant them. Further if Brexit impacts on the remit of the CJEU, this will mean that UK 
same-sex couples will miss out on developments in this regard in relation to expanding non-
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